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Privacy and celebrity 1
by Michael Tugendhat QC
In this two-part article, Michael Tugendhat QC discusses the issues surrounding the 
disclosure of personal information in the media.
INTRODUCTION
Celebrity is an honour. In a democracy it is normally a reward for success. Sportsmen and artists earn it by skill. Businessmen and TV personalities earn it 
by wit. Politicians earn it by votes. Anyone can aspire to it. 
It is the public who confer celebrity. The media stimulates 
the public. But in the end celebrity is conveyed by the 
public's choices as consumers and electors. There is also a 
type of celebrity, which is more or less involuntary. Princes 
and Princesses acquire it by birth or by marriage. Other 
people acquire it by their chance involvement in 
newsworthy events. Privacy can cover a variety of legal 
concepts. For today I am concerned with only one of these 
concepts. It is intormational privacy   the disclosure of 
personal information in the media.
Celebrity mimics friendship. We know the faces of 
celebrities as well as we know the faces of our friends and 
acquaintances. Friends exchange personal information 
about each other. So the public expects to know as much 
about a celebrity as they know about their friends. But 
celebrities do not know the public. There is no natural 
exchange of information. Celebrities try to control the 
personal information that is disclosed about them.
THE ISSUE
How much control should they have? That is the 
question. Stimulated by ECHR, Art. 8 the courts have 
begun to develop a new law to protect privacy. They have 
done this by developing the law of confidentiality. But it 
seems to me that any future development of a law of 
privacy will have to take account of the law of libel. I also 
question whether a law protecting the disclosure of 
personal information can develop without some changes in 
the law of libel.
The ideas in this talk arise from having to answer 
questions asked by journalists and celebrities alike. The 
questions concern stories, or intended stories, on personal 
topics. For example: the state of a couple's marriage or 
other relationship, some past incident of a sexual nature, 
unusual religious or philosophical beliefs, eating disorders 
or more serious matters of health. Can the story be 
published or stopped by injunction? If it is published, can 
there be a claim for damages?o
Some have claimed that there was no English right ofo o
privacy in this sense (Malone v Metropolitan Commissioner
[1979] Ch 344, 372 and also Kaye v Robertson [1991] FSR 
62, 66, Court of Appeal). That was only ever true in part. 
It is true that publication of personal information about an 
individual has not been unlawful simply because it was 
personal or private, at least until this year.
But personal and private information has been protected 
in a number of cases, not because it is private, but for 
other incidental reasons. These reasons include:
  confidentiality;
  libel;
  various privacy statutes; and
  the self-regulation of the press.
It is necessary to consider these.
COMMON LAW CLAIMS
Conjiden tiality
Confidentiality is a cause of action that can be used to 
protect personal information. But confidentiality did not 
protect personal information because it was personal. It 
protected it if and because the person disclosing the 
information was subject to an obligation of confidence) o
arising out of a relationship. Two celebrity cases are Prince 
Albert's etchings of the Royal family in Prince Albert v Strange 
(1849) 1 Mac & G 25 (affirming (1848) 2 De G & Sm 652, 
and the sensational revelations which the Duke and Duchess 
of Argyll made or wanted to make about their marriage in 
Duchess of Argyll v Duke of Argyll [1967] Ch 302. In Prince 
Albert's case the relationship arose out of the provision of 
services to him. In the Argyll case the relationship was 
husband and wife. In the Argyll case the judgment gives no 
detail of the information at all. The fact that the 
information was personal plays little part in the court's 
reasoning. Confidentiality gave the same legal protection to 
information, which is purely commercial, such as a trade 
secret. That was the position until the decision of Butler- 
Sloss P in Variables v NGN [2000] 1 All ER 908.
Reported cases where confidentiality involved personal 
information are rare. And in many of them the claim has 
failed. One difficulty for a claimant is the defence of public 
domain. Once a fact has been published, so it is said, there 
is no longer any confidentiality for the law to protect. 
Public domain gives a clear defence in confidentiality 
cases, which involve trade secrets and government secrets.o
Public domain is also a defence in cases of personal
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information, but its scope is not so clear. In addition to 
public domain, public interest is also a defence in 
confidentiality. But what is meant by public interest has 
never been defined. There is a further difficulty with the 
law of confidentiality. It is unclear how confidentiality 
works when the information is, or may be, untrue.
Libel
The law that is normally invoked to protect personal 
information - and invoked extensively by celebrities - is 
not confidentiality, but libel. Libel does sanction the 
disclosure of personal information because it is personal. 
Libel looks at what is said. It does not require any prior 
relationship between the claimant and the defendant.
In libel the words or images complained of must refer to 
the claimant. It does not matter to what part of the 
claimant's life the publication complained of relates. It 
may relate to something deeply private, such as health or 
sexual life. It may relate to business or politics. But the 
subject of a libel action must always be information that is 
personal in the sense that it refers to an identifiable person 
who is the claimant. Celebrity libel actions commonly do 
involve health, sex and relationships.
In libel there is no defence of public domain   it does 
not matter that the publication may have been made 
previously, however often or however widely. There are 
public interest defences, known as privilege. But privilege 
protects publications, which the defendant is not alleging 
to be true. So public interest is very narrowly defined. 
Unless the publication relates to certain defined subjects, 
such as proceedings in court or in Parliament, defendants 
must generally show that they were under a duty to make 
the publication and that the intended publisher had a 
corresponding interest in receiving the publication. In 
Reynolds v Times [1999] 3 WLR 1010, it was recognised a 
duty to make disclosure to the public in general. It is still 
not an easy defence to make good, because the defendant
J O '
has to prove that he has acted responsibly.
In so far that it has been so pood for the libel claimant,o '
there are however, two catches, which limit the use of libel in 
the protection of personal information. The first catch is that 
the publication must be false. Or rather, the information 
published may be true, but the defendant must not be able 
to prove that it is true. The burden of proof is notoriously 
on the defendant. Journalists resent this burden of proof. 
They point to libel cases, which have succeeded when the 
publication was true, but there was no legal proof available at 
the time of the trial. This effect of the burden of proof in libel 
can also be seen as a crude and limited protection to the 
private life of claimants. But falsity is not enough to found a 
libel action. The second catch in libel is that the publication 
must be defamatory: it must tend to lower the claimant's 
reputation in the view of right thinking members of society.
The overriding principle in the law of defamation is that 
truth justifies any publication at all. If a publication can be
proved true, then it does not matter how private the 
information may be, or how humiliating it may be. It does 
not matter how lacking in public interest it may be. 
Subject to any confidential relationship, no publication of 
personal information can be unlawful provided it is true. 
This is a central principle of the law of libel.
It is this priority given to truth as the public interest in 
freedom of expression that has limited the development of 
a law of privacy (Malone v Metropolitan Police Commissioner 
[1979] Ch 344, 357). The degree of priority given to truth 
has long been controversial. The justification for it needs 
consideration in the light of modern developments.
PRIVACY STATUTES AND SELF- 
REGULATION
While the common law gives this absolute priority to 
truth, many statutes do not. Most statutes were prompted 
by the development of modern technology such as 
telecommunication, broadcasting and computers. See the 
Wireless Telegraphy Act 1949, s.5, the Interception of 
Communications Act 1985 and the Regulation of Investigatory 
Powers Act 2000.
Broadcasting
The Broadcasting Act 1996, s. 107(l)(b), requires that 
unwarranted infringement of privacy be avoided as is similarly 
undefined in article 9 of the French Code Civil. What is 
meant by privacy and justifications for any interference with 
it, are left undefined by the statute. But a body of law is being 
developed. There are adjudications of the Broadcasting 
Standards Commission and the Independent Television 
Commission. Some of these have been judicially reviewed.
Data Protection
Computers gave rise to another statute. Personal 
information on databases was subject to the Data Protection 
Act 1984, re-enacted in 1998. This was based on the 1981 
Council of Lurope Convention. That Convention in turn 
implemented ECHR, Art. 8. ECHR, Art. 8 has now been 
incorporated into Community Law affecting the rights of 
individuals as between one another under the Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic: 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 24 October 1995 [1995] OJ L281/31 
Processing of Personal Data, which was opened for 
signature on 28 January 1981.
ECHR, Art. 8(1) provides that:
'Everyone has the right to respect Jor his private andjamily life, 
his home and his correspondence.'
The public interest exception in Article 8(2) requires that 
any interference with private life must be:
'... necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national 
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, Jor
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the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or Jor the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.'
The data protection legislation is a comprehensive privacy 
code. It covers almost all personal information kept in a 
computer, or in any form of structured files. The effect of the 
data protection legislation is to introduce a new statutory tort 
of unfair use of personal information. The central 
requirement of the data protection legislation is that personal 
information cannot be disclosed unless the collection, 
disclosure (and any other processing of the information) is 
done fairly and lawfully. Fairness almost always requires the 
consent of the subject of the information. Consent must be 
fully informed consent   Data Protection Act 1998, Sched. 1, 
Pt. 1, para. 1 and Sched. 2, para. 1. The publication does not 
have to be defamatory. It is irrelevant whether it is true or 
false, or confidential or not. All that is required is that the 
information be contained in a database or in a structured file, 
and relate to a living individual.
o
The 1984 Act applied only to computers. In the early 
1980s it was mainly governments and large companies that 
used computers. Today computers are everywhere, and the 
field of application of the statute has followed. Almost 
every book, newspaper and broadcast is now produced 
with computer technology. The result is that what was 
originally a law of privacy confined by technical criteria just 
to mainframe computers, has become of very general 
application. The field to be covered by any common law of 
privacy is correspondingly reduced.
In data protection legislation there is a very limited 
public domain defence. It applies where information has 
been made public as a result of steps deliberately taken by 
the person to whom it relates   Data Protection Act 1998, 
Sched. 3, para. 5. There are some public interest defences, 
but they are narrowly defined, too narrowly in my view, to 
comply with ECHR, Arts 8 and 10.
The data protection statute has a special category of 
'sensitive' information   section 6 of the Data Protection Act 
1998. This relates to racial or ethnic origin, political 
opinions or religious or other beliefs, trade union 
membership, physical or mental health or condition, 
sexual life, the commission or alleged commission of
' o
criminal of any offence. This last category includes any 
proceedings for any offence committed or alleged to have 
been committed, the disposal of such proceedings or the 
sentence of any court in such proceedings.
Rehabilitation of Offenders
An earlier and narrower privacy statute was the 
Rehabilitation of Offenders Act 1974. Under that Act, 
criminal convictions become spent after specified periods. 
When they are spent, the convicted persons do not 
normally have to disclose their convictions. If questions are 
asked about previous convictions, they are treated as not 
relating to spent convictions under section 4(2). There is
an analogy with information which is exempted from the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. A public 
authority need neither confirm nor deny whether it has 
exempt information. To make the Rehabilitation of Offenders 
Act work, the law of libel had to be altered. Spent 
convictions can be relied on in a plea of justification, but 
uniquely in the law of libel, the defence of justification is 
defeated by proof of malice under section 4 (5)   see 
Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th ed.), para. 17.16. If a 
spent conviction is protected by Article 8, then the 
availability of the defence should not depend on malice, 
but on an assessment of the competing public interests for 
and against publication).
The Press Complaints Commission
Notoriously, the newspaper and book media have not 
been subjected to the privacy legislation applied to 
broadcasters. There have been many private members Bills. 
There have been inquiries by the Calcutt Committee (for 
which see the Report of the Committee on Privacy and 
Related Matters Cm. 1102 and several committees before 
Calcutt mentioned in para. 1.4). None resulted in legislation. 
One reason for this was that in the 1970s and 1980s there 
was little consensus as to what personal information should 
be protected, or what defences should be available. There 
was little practical experience of privacy in England.
All that has changed. Calcutt led to the setting up of the 
self-regulatory regime of the Press Complaints 
Commission. But what is more important is the life and 
death of the greatest celebrity of all: Princess Diana. 
During her life she attracted immense public attention. 
The media ceaselessly published personal information 
about her, whether with, or without, her consent. It was 
often hard to tell. The possibility of this attention being 
turned on her two children had to be prevented. As a 
result the PCC Code was amended. From 1998 it 
incorporated almost verbatim Article 8(1) of the ECHR. 
It went further. It gives its own interpretation of Article 
8(1) in numerous respects. Specific restrictions apply to 
children, to victims of accidents and to details of race, 
colour, religion, sex and physical or mental impairments 
under paras 5, 6, 12 and 13 of the PCC Code. The right 
to privacy is expressed to apply to places where there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. This has been held 
under Code art. 3, Hello! PCC Report 43 1998, to apply to 
a celebrity in a church, which is open to the public.
Other provisions of the PCC code are less favourable to 
celebrities. The public interest provision is crucial. Here 
the PCC Code does not repeat the words of Article 8(2). 
It gives its own interpretation, which includes:
'(i) Detecting or exposing crime or a serious misdemeanour, 
(ii) Protecting public health and safety,
(in) Preventing the public from being misled by some statement or 
action of an individual or organisation.'
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Compare the ITC Code para 2.1 which adds '(iv) 
exposing significant incompetence in public office' and 
para 2.3 which refers to 'disreputable behaviour'. The BSC 
Code, para. 14 is similar in wording to the ITC's: instead 
of 'serious misdemeanour' it speaks of 'disreputable 
behaviour'  the disclosure of disreputable behaviour is in 
the public interest.
Clearly the public interest exception does not just apply to 
politicians and those involved in governmental affairs. Any 
celebrity can behave disreputably and mislead the public. 
The phrase 'disreputable behaviour' is an interpretation of 
the words 'protection of health or morals', which appears in 
ECHR, Art. 8(2). Disreputable behaviour implies a low 
threshold for satisfying this test. Public interest is the 
media's justification for many disclosures. These would be 
harder to justify if Article 8(2) raise a higher threshold. Such 
justification does not always succeed (see The Sunday Mail 
PCC Report No. 41 1998, The Sunday People PCC Report 
No.43 1998 and The Sunday Mail PCC Report No.43 1998).
Since the death of Princess Diana, there have been 
increasing numbers of adjudications, by the PCC, the BSC 
and the ITC. These represent a sort of jurisprudence on 
the interpretation of Article 8. Whether or not these 
adjudications are all correct, or even consistent, is open to 
debate. But what cannot be denied is that they show what 
problems arise from privacy laws protecting personal 
information. They point the way for the judges to follow.
Examples are the adjudications on the defence of public 
domain. Public domain has been held not to justify-:
  the repetition of material which has been extensively 
published in the press, or in a previous broadcast (see R 
v BCC, ex pane Granada [1995] EMLR 163, 168, BSC on 
The Cook Report Update, Carlton TV, 4 June 1996 and 16 
December 97; ITC Central News at Six, October 1999); or
  the broadcast of a person's names and date of birth (see 
BSC on Ed Stewart Show, BBC Radio 2, 10 July 1998; 
BBC Producers' Guidelines Chap. 4, para.7); or
  the broadcast of an inappropriate photograph without 
permission (see BSC on Serena Shand, Meet the In-laws, 
ITV, 14 November 1998, but cf. Gena Dodd, Panorama: 
The Surrogate, BBC, 3 November 97).
  The PCC has held there to be an infringement of privacy 
where a newspaper published details of a child's medical 
condition although it had been mentioned in open court 
(see The Hastings and St Leonard's Observer, Report 41, 
1998).
The extent to which public domain is a defence in cases 
of personal information remains unsettled. A view- 
expressed by Lord Keith is that the defence -should really 
focus on whether there would be harm. Would the 
republication cause harm that was not caused by the 
earlier publication? (See Spycatcher, Att-Gen v Guardian 
Newspapers (No.2) [1990] 1 AC 109, 260f-g). In most cases
a test of proportionality also has to be applied (Z v Finland 
(1997) 25 EHRR 371, paras 99, 112). So the fact that a 
person has put one particular part of her life in the public 
domain does not mean that the press can then publicise 
every other part her life (Ashworth v MGN [2001] 1 All ER 
991, 1002J §54; Ms Pirie PCC Complaint 23 January 2000; 
cf Gatley para. 12.29).
European case law
In 1999 Professor Barendt surveyed the national laws of 
other European countries and the European Court of 
Human Rights itself (Conference Reports: Freedom of 
expression and the right to privacy, Strasbourg 23 September 
1999, DH-MM (2000) 7 Council of Europe, p.57, 
http://www.humanrights.coe.int/media   for a recent 
review of German law see Birgit Bromrnekamp, Yearbook of 
Copyright and Media Law 2000 (OUP)). He was able to derive 
a list of examples of subjects for privacy. The list is not 
dissimilar from sensitive information in the data protection 
legislation. The examples included: anonymity in certain 
types of legal proceedings; information about a person's 
physical or mental health; membership of (or donations to) 
churches, political parties and other associations; intimate 
personal photographs; in addition to data protection rights 
and what the Americans call 'false light' (false portrayal, 
sham interviews and distorted photographs). Our courts 
may derive guidance from this survey.
CONFIDENTIALITY - THE NEW LAW
Eord Woolf MR has said that privacy is not an area in 
which the courts are well equipped to adjudicate (R. v BSC, 
ex pane BIBC [2000] 3 All ER 989, para. 14). Most 
journalists agree. They place more trust in the self- 
regulatory bodies than in judges. So if the courts are going 
to enlarge the legal protection for personal information, 
the adjudications of the self-regulatory regimes are sources 
which English judges can use as a guide. The Human Rights 
Act 1998, s.l 2 now requires the courts to have regard to 
the Codes, in deciding the competing claims of freedom of 
expression and respect for private life. Judges can also look 
to the statutes and foreign laws I have mentioned. All of 
these are ultimately derived from Article 8 of ECHR.
Venables v News Group Newspapers [2000] 1 All ER 908, 
marks an important development. Most judgments in this 
area of the law are interlocutory, but this was a final 
judgment by a leading judge. In Venables, Dame Elizabeth 
Butler-Sloss was compelled to develop the common law to 
protect the new identities given to two child murderers. As 
she explained, the Codes cannot prevent a threatened 
publication, and where publication may endanger a 
person's safety, a remedy after publication is not enough 
([2000] 1 All ER 908, para. 96). She might have added 
that the Codes do not cover books or imported 
publications. So the Codes do not guarantee protection of 
confidential information, even if they are complied with by
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those to whom they apply   see Gitta Sereny, Cries Unheard: 
The Story of Mary Bell (Papermac, 1998). There will also be 
cases where compensation is appropriate, and the Codes 
do not provide for that.
What the President of the Family Division has held is 
that no pre-existing relationship is required to give rise to 
confidentiality. An injunction may restrain the disclosure 
of true personal information if it is necessary to do so to 
uphold another human right. As she has stated the law, a 
duty of confidence does already arise when confidential 
information comes to the knowledge of the media, ino '
circumstances in which the media have notice of its 
confidentiality ([2000] 1 All ER 908, para. 81).
In Venables it was ECHR, Arts 2 and 3 that prevailed over 
Art. 10. It was not an Article 8 case. But the right to
o
private life under Article 8 is capable of prevailing over 
freedom of speech in an appropriate case (paras 48-51 
following of Sedley LJ in Douglas v Hello! [2001] 2 WLR 
992, paras 133-4). This is recognised in Article 10(2).
There are many uncertainties in how Venables will apply in 
Article 8 cases. What circumstances will give the media 
notice that confidentiality applies? An example given in 
Venables is medical information. Will the same apply to such
information as to racial or ethnic origin, political opinions 
or religious or other beliefs, trade union membership, 
physical or mental health or condition, sexual life, the 
commission or alleged commission of criminal of any 
offence? What public domain defence will be available for 
personal information? Will the public domain defence be 
unqualified (as it is for trade and government secrets)? Or 
will it be limited to cases of consent, as in data protection, 
or to cases of harm, as suggested by Lord Keith?
To answer these questions, we must resolve the 
conflicting principles of new law of confidentiality, where 
truth is not a defence, and the law of libel, which gives 
priority to the defence of truth. Suppose we take a case 
like Elton John's ([1997] QB 586). The claimant is said to 
be suffering from an eating disorder. The libel jury 
awarded Elton John £350,000 in damages which was 
substituted with £75,000 by the Court of Appeal. But 
what was infringed? Was it his reputation or his private 
life? Should the claim be brought in libel, oro '
confidentiality? @
In thejolloning article, Michael Tugendhat QC discusses Jurther the 
conflicting principles of the law of confidentiality and the law of libel.
Frank \\oolridge
The situation of 
preferred shareholders 
in France, Belgium and 
Germany
by Frank Wooldridge
Public companies in European countries, as well as in Commonwealth countries and the United States, frequently find it necessary to have more than one 
class of shares. They may thus issue preference shares 
(which are sometimes not granted voting rights) in addition 
to ordinary shares. Founders' shares, which are called parts 
beneficiaries in Belgium, now appear rare, but some 
companies in the United Kingdom and Germany continue 
to have more than one class of preference share. In the 
United Kingdom, the company's memorandum, articles or 
terms of issue largely determine the rights of preference
shareholders. In some countries, provisions contained in 
the company's statutes or specific statutory provisions 
governing preference shares supplement terms of issue. 
Such provisions exist in other European countries such as 
France, Belgium and Germany. However useful they may 
be in settling certain questions, the volume of United 
Kingdom litigation concerning the rights of preference 
shareholders tends to lead one to the view that such 
provisions are unlikely to settle all questions regarding the 
rights of such shareholders. However, the relevant 
legislation is of some interest for comparative lawyers.
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